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Abstract
This paper presents a macroeconomic model with crime, human capital, and
three taxation policies (consumption, labour, and capital income taxes). In an
extension, we endogenize the probability of escaping punishment to depend on gov-
ernment expenditure on public security/police. The model is solved analytically
and numerically to derive propositions, which are then veried empirically using
cross-country data. Compared to the literature, we nd a much higher threshold
probability. Above the threshold, the equilibrium crime rate is positively related
to the escape probability. In addition, above this threshold level, a rise in capital
income tax or a decline in labour income tax would lead to a higher equilibrium
crime rate, if the taxes are modelled using marginal tax rates. There also appears to
be empirical supports where the equilibrium human capital level depends positively
on consumption tax. Lastly, when the probability is endogenized, there also exists a
threshold level for the spending on public security/police, above which consumption
tax and capital income tax have positive e¤ects on the equilibrium level of human
capital.
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Ever since the contribution of Becker (1968), most contributions to the economic literature
on crime focus upon the incentive to commit crime as a response to the expected return
to crime, where the latter depends on the degree of enforcement or the probability of
punishment. Notable studies include Imrohoroglu et al. (2004, 2006), Engelhardt et al.
(2008), and Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013), all of whom emphasize the importance
of the punishment probability upon the crime rate. Indeed, from Ehrlich (1973) to the
more recent studies of Corman and Mocan (2000), Evans and Owens (2007), Lin (2009),
Draca et al. (2011), and Harbaugh et al. (2013), a robust inverse relationship between
deterrence measures and crime have been established. Nevertheless, recent controversies
surrounding police funding cut in the UK raise an often neglected issue in the economics
of crime: how the di¤erent tax policy instruments would di¤er in their implications on
the crime rate, especially in an economy with human capital considerations.
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting a dynamic general equilibrium
model with crime, human capital, and three di¤erent tax policies (labour income, capital
income, and consumption taxes). Further, in an extension, we endogenize the punishment
probability usually treated as exogenous to depend on the government expenditure on
public security/police. The model is solved analytically and numerically to derive propo-
sitions, which are then tested empirically using cross-country data. Notably, consistent
with relevant literature, we establish the existence of a threshold probability of escaping
punishment above which the equilibrium crime rate is positively related to the probability,
though the threshold found is much higher in the presence of human capital and tax con-
siderations. In addition, we also show empirically that, above this threshold level, a rise
in capital income tax or a decline in labour income tax leads to a higher equlibrium crime
rate, if the taxes are modelled using marginal tax rates instead of government revenue-
calculated average tax rates. Empirical support is also found for a positive relationship
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between the equilibrium human capital level and consumption tax. Lastly, when the ex-
penditure on police is introduced, there is additional empirical evidence of a threshold
level for the spending on public order and security, above which consumption tax and
capital income tax have positive e¤ects on the equilibrium level of human capital. If long-
term public spending on public order and security is above the threshold level, there is an
economic rationale to fund this spending using consumption and capital income taxes.
In general, recent macroeconomic models of crime have taken two directions. Based
on Pissarides type of search considerations, studies such as Engelhardt et al. (2008),
Engelhardt (2010), Long and Polito (2014), and Braun (2017) focus on the e¤ects of
unemployment frictions on crime. These have a predominant labour market policy focus.
On the other hand, with the alternative direction, crime is explored in the context of
multi-sectorial growth models. Of note is the overlapping generations model of Neanidis
and Papadopoulou (2013), which examines the link between crime and fertility via a
tradeo¤ between criminal activity and child-rearing. Mocan et al. (2005) incorporate
elements of human capital in allowing individuals to choose between legal and illegal
activity. Our paper is closest to these two studies, in that we introduce a time allocation
tradeo¤ similar to Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013), while examining the interactions of
crime and human capital as in Mocan et al. (2005). The novel aspects in our approach are
that, in addition to the introduction of a Glomm-Ravikumar (1997, 2001) type of human
capital elements and the di¤erent tax considerations, compared to the former, we model
crime as an optimal choice of time allocation by individuals, therefore possessing a direct
tradeo¤ to market work. We also recognize time allocation as an issue that necessitates
a model with shorter time horizon than an overlapping generations framework. Unlike
these studies, our paper also introduces a direct tradeo¤(through time allocation) between
criminal activity and e¤ective (human capital adjusted) market activity. An asymmetric
structure is introduced in that crime is specied as not depending on human capital,
which generally ts the nature of non-organized crime such as theft/robbery better.
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On the other hand, in comparison to the standard human capital literature, another
novel contribution is that, we apply a slightly di¤erent approach in modelling human
capital and growth: human capital is modelled as a time-bounded productivity factor
instead of a conventional Lucas-type disembodied approach, where human capital stock
is allowed to grow without bounds. As such, endogenous growth is generated using a
standard AK-framework. This means in the steady state, output grows at the same
constant rate as the physical capital stock, rather than the stock of human capital.1 ;2
Unlike in a human capital-driven growth setting, this allows us to avoid having crime a
direct trade-o¤ to e¤ective market hours to be unambigiously bad to economic growth.
Indeed, as shown below in the empirical section, this modelling choice is consistent with
the empirical evidence.
In terms of the literature on di¤erent tax structures, since Leibfritz et al. (1997) doc-
umented a gradual shift over time from capital to labour income taxes, and subsequently
consumption taxes, empirical evidence predominantly favours consumption tax as the
most growth-friendly taxation policy. For instance, based on an error correction model
(with human capital) applied to OECD economies, Arnold (2008) nds both personal and
corporate income taxes to be associated with lower growth but not consumption taxes.
Gemmell et al. (2014) improve on these studies by introducing marginal tax rates and
compare them to the relatively macro-based average tax rates in a small open economy
context. However, by design, a shortcoming these empirical papers generally have is lim-
ited theoretical grounding, and therefore do not allow for the analytical understanding
of the relationships between policy variables. We set out to examine the implications of
di¤erent taxes in this model with crime and human capital, focusing primarily on the
1The level of human capital determines e¤ective market hours used in production. However, its
positive economic e¤ect is partly mitigated in this model in that, it also determines the actual realized
hours that trade o¤ those of leisure hours.
2Our model is therefore in the same spirit as studies with embodied human capital modelling ap-
proach, such as Tanaka and Iwaisako (2009), Agénor and Canuto (2017). These studies with overlapping
generations model bind/constraint human capital to a distribution of productivity among the agents,
while we provide the counterpart in a hourly context.
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long-term relationships.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
model is solved for its equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 presents comparative statics of
equilibrium crime rate and human capital with respect to the set of policy arrangements,
with the analytically derived propositions also examined numerically. Section 5 considers
the extension of endogenizing punishment probability to government spending on public
security/police. It is then followed by Section 6, which empirically evaluates the derived
propositions using cross-country panel growth regressions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Preferences: The economy is populated by a large number of innitely lived, over-




tu(ct; lt; ht+1); (1)
where  denotes the subjective discount factor, ct, lt, and ht+1 refer to consumption,
leisure, and the next-period level of human capital3.
Each individual is endowed with   hours of time in each period t. At the beginning
of each period, an individual chooses the time to be allocated to both market work (nt)
and criminal activity (t). However, the actual realized hours for the former at the end
of the period t is e¤ective in nature because it is productivity-(human capital-)adjusted.
The disutility associated with the tradeo¤ from leisure therefore comes from the e¤ective
human capital-adjusted market work (htnt), the time spent in commiting crime (t), and
a xed exogenous amount of time in other non-economic productive activity ("). This
3In a nite generational overlapping generations (OLG) setting, such as a typical setting commonly
seen in the literature where individuals live for three periods and each individual is assumed to have one
child in each period, ht+1 can be interpreted as the human capital of the children.
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means lt =    htnt   t   ", htnt   . This bounded (by time) specication essentially
gives a per-hour context to the level of human capital, in which it is measured as a
per-hour productivity factor that is only relevant to market work, taken as given by the
individuals.4
We believe this specication improves on more commonly used alternatives, such as
  = lt+nt+t+", or   = lt+nt+t+ht+". The former assumes human capital activity
to be completely independent of leisure and market work considerations by households,
even though it is customary for a human capital-based model to assume complementarity
in the production side. On the other hand, the shortcoming of the latter is that, while it
incorporates training as a time allocation choice, it assumes no complementarity between
human capital and market work by treating them as a direct trade-o¤. Our specication
accounts for some disutility from human capital activity (via its inuence on the actual
e¤ective working hours) yet allows for the modelling of a direct trade-o¤ between the
productivity-adjusted market hours and the non-human capital related criminal activity
(theft/robbery in the context of this model), a key feature dropped in studies such as
Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013). By implication of the time-bounded specication,
this also partly mitigates a well-known shortcoming associated with standard Uzawa-
Lucas models, in which human capital is disembodied and allowed to grow innitely
without bounds despite individuals having physical limitations.
Following Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013), we assume that all individuals allocate
time to criminal activity, and that they can be both perpetrators and victims of crime
an agent homogeneity and non-mutually exclusive specication that is in consistent with
Mocan et al. (2005) and Mauro and Carmeci (2007). Similarly, in line with studies such
as Imrohoro¼glu et al. (2004, 2006), the income from criminal activity, interpretable as
4The interpretation to our specication is that, while individuals choose their time allocation to market
works (nt), it is the disutility from e¤ective working hours that has to be accounted for in its trade-o¤
with leisure. For example, a researcher or manager contracted for 8 hours of daily work is often required
to work more in e¤ective terms, compared to a routine-task administrator who is contracted for the same
hours.
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either theft or robbery in this context, xt, is specied as
xt = t(1  )htntwt. (2)
In addition to legal and illegal income, individuals accumulate assets in the form of
government bonds (bt) and physical capital (kt), while also spend zt amount of resources
in education5. In each period, an individuals budget constraint is given by
(1  v)(1  n)htntwt + xt + (1 + rBt )bt 1 + (rkt   )(1   k)kt 1 + kt 1 (3)
= (1 +  c)ct + bt + kt + zt;
where v is the (equal) probability of becoming a victim of crime6,  2 (0; 1) the prob-
ability of escaping punishment, wt the real wage rate, n labour income tax rate,  c
consumption tax rate,  k capital income tax rate, rkt the market interest rate, r
B
t the re-
turns on governmental bonds, and  the depreciation rate. Moreover, it is assumed that,
when an individual is caught and punished (with probability 1   ), the illegal income
from crime is conscated by the government.
Individuals maximize their intertemporal utility (1) by choosing ct, nt, zt, t, bt, and




= 1 + (rkt   )(1   k); (4)
uc;t





(1  v + t)(1  n)
(1  n)nt : (6)
rBt = (r
k
t   )(1   k): (7)
5Again, if the model were to be simplied to having a simple three generational OLG setting instead
of a generalized one, this amount is interpretable as parentsinvestment in childrens education.
6Similar to Imrohoglu et al. (2004, 2006), we assume that the incidence of crime is random and the
criminals do not have the ability to target victims based on their income. For simplicity, it is also assumed
that a victimized individual would lost all her/his after-tax wage income.
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Human Capital: In consistent with the model specication of studies linking
human capital and public spending on education, such as Glomm and Ravikumar (1997,
2001), Blankenau et al. (2007), and Agénor (2011), human capital accumulation depends
on private spending on education, e¢ ciency-adjusted public spending on education, as
well as the accumulated stock of human capital in the economy, proxied by the average
level of human capital in the previous period. Specically, human capital accumulates in









where E 2 (0; 1) is an e¢ ciency parameter on government spending, 1; 2  0, and
both components of education spending (public, gEt , and private, zt) are denoted as a
percentage of the nal output level in the economy7.
Final Output: A continuum of identical rms, indexed by i 2 (0; 1), produce a
nonstorable homogeneous nal good using private inputs in the form of private physi-
cal capital and e¤ective labour. Assuming a CobbDouglas technology, the production




where ki;t is the rm-specic stock of physical capital, ni;t the labour hours, Ht the




private capital stock. There is constant return to scale to production, which is also subject
to an Arrow-Romer type of production externalities associated with the aggregate private
capital stock.
7By virtue of the specication, htnt   , human capital in this model has a per hour context, in
that it can be interpreted as some sort of per-hour productivity multiplicative factor. Given that its
production function depends on E , g
E
t =Yt, and zt=Yt, all 2 (0; 1), the boundary condition would hold
for all solutions of h.
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The rst-order conditions of rm i are:
wt = (1  ) Yi;t
Htni;t




Given that Yt =
R 1
0
Yi;tdi, and that all rms and workers are identical, in a symmetric
equilibrium, ni;t = nt, ki;t = kt = kt. Thus, (10) can be rewritten as
wt = (1  ) Yt
Htnt








Following Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013), to generate endogenous growth, we
assume  = $. This then allows us to rewrite (12) in the standard AK-form, and express





Government: Government revenue is obtained by taxing wages, consumption, and
capital income at constant rates of n,  c, and  k respectively. When caught and punished,
the illegal income of the individuals is conscated by the government. Following Davig
et al. (2011) and Polito and Wickens (2015), the goverment (i) raises funds by issuing
bonds, bt; (ii) repays the principals (plus interest, rBt ) from the previous period t   1.
The government expenditure, gt, is on education (gEt ), public security/police (g
P
t ), and
all other categories (gOt ). In line with Goulas and Zervoyianni (2015), g
P
t is assumed
to be non-economic productive in the benchmark model, though we extend the analysis
by endogenizing the probability of escaping punishment, , to depend negatively on the
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public spending on public security, gPt , in the later section.








=  cct + nwtHtnt +  k(r
k
t   )kt 1 + bt   (1 + rBt )bt 1 + (1  )t(1  n)htntwt;
where, in line with studies such as Agénor (2011) and Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013),
each individual component of spending is assumed to be a constant fraction of the total
government revenue, as in
ght = vh[ cct + nwtHtnt +  k(r
k
t   )kt 1 + bt (15)
 (1 + rBt )bt 1 + (1  )t(1  n)htntwt];















where by denition, the net issuance of public bonds equals the sovereign debt-to-GDP
ratio of the economy, and dt=Yt  0.
Closing the Economy: To close the model, the economy-wide resource constraint
is given by
Yt = ct + gt + kt   (1  )kt 1; (17)
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where, after substituting in (14), is equivalent to
Yt = (1 +  c)ct + [n + (1  )t(1  n)]wtHtnt (18)
+kt   [(1  )   k(rkt   )]kt 1 + bt   (1 + rBt )bt 1:
3 Model Solutions and Equilibrium Conditions
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with the growth rate being determined by












  2t   "]2 ; (24)




(1 +  c))
2 .
To solve the model, we dene the following equilibrium conditions:
Denition 1: A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fct; nt; zt; tg1t=0,
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prices fwt; rkt ; rBt g1t=0, physical capital stock and government bonds fkt; btg1t=0, and human
capitalfhtg1t=0 such that, given initial stocks k0; b0; h0 > 0, a set of policy arrangements
f c; n;  k; vE; vP ; vOg, and an (escape) punishment probability , all individuals maximize
utility, all rms maximize prots, the government mantains its budget in accordance to its
debt sustainability rule, and all markets clear. In addition, individual human capital level
must be equal to the economy-wide average level of human capital, so that ht = Ht,8t.
Denition 2: A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which: (i) the
choice variables (ct; nt; zt; t), physical capital (kt), human capital (ht), nal output (Yt),
and government bonds (bt) are constant 8t, (ii) rates of return (rkt ; rBt ) are constant, and
(iii) individual and aggregate behaviour are consistent. In addition, the probability of
victimization equals the aggregate crime incidence rate, that is v = t  (see Imrohoro¼glu
et al., 2004).







8t. As also derived in Appendix A, the stationary equilibrium solution is characterized
by the two key equations describing the equilibrium crime rate (~) and the equilibrium
level of human capital ( ~H):
f(~) = (1  )n   1 +  k + (1 +  c)(1) 1[(    1   ") (25)
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2 + (1 +  c)(1)







































+ (1  )n + (2   2 c1 )~
+









   [ 1 + (1  ( ) 1)~]1 
o




Applying the implicit function theorem to (25) and directly di¤erentiating (26) with
respect to  and the tax policy parameters, we can examine the e¤ects of the various
policy arrangements on the crime incidence (~) and the level of human capital ( ~H) in
stationary equilibrium.
4 Crime, Human Capital, and Taxation
The comparative statics of the equilibrium ~ and ~H with respect to ,  c,  k, n are
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   [ 1 + (1  ( ) 1)~]1 
o
  [ 1 + (1  ( ) 1)~] 1; (32)
and fc = 0, where 1 < 0, 1c > 0, and 1n > 0.
Proposition 1: @~=@ c = 0. The equilibrium crime rate is independent of the
consumption tax.
We know that 1   ( ) 1 > 0 (since   > 1), and for most combinations of  ,
( ) 1   2 < 0 can be established. This means f < 0. Similarly, for fk > 0, for a
reasonably small value of , it is straightforward to establish that fk > 0, which means
@~=@ k > 0. However, as seen from the derived expressions, the signs of f and fn are
generally ambiguous, which therefore require numerical evaluations.
For the equilibrium human capital level ( ~H), the following comparative statics are
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Analytically, we can establish that @ ~H=@ c > 0 since the terms,    1 "+~[( ) 1 
2], in (34) equal to the equlibrium level of leisure, ~l, which is assumed to be non-zero.
Likewise, because 1n > 0 and  c~l > 1, @ ~H=@n < 0 can also be established analytically.
The signs of the remaining partial derivatives cannot be established analytically and are
evaluated numerically.
For the numerical evaluations, we parameterize the model as follows. The elasticity
of nal output with respect to private capital, , is set at a fairly standard value of 0:3.
The two parameters in human capital production function, 1 for government spending
and 2 for household spending, are set at 0:2, which is consistent with the empirical
estimate of Blankenau et al. (2007) and parameter values used by Chen (2005) and
Agénor (2011). For the tax variables, we use the G7-average in the OECD tax database,
and set  k = 0:282 (in line with the corporate income tax rate),  c = 0:126 (in line with
the goods and services tax rate), and n = 0:276 (in line with all-in average personal
income tax rate)8.
For the time allocation, assuming 8 hours of sleep,   = 16. We set the time spent in
other non-economic productive activity, " = 2. For the remaining time spent on e¤ective
work, leisure, and crime, the parameterisation is bounded by (   ") = ~l+ ~h~n+ ~, as well
as the equilibrium condition, ~h~n =  1 + ~[1   ( ) 1];  2 (0; 1). With   0:5 being
the usual baseline set in related studies, we set  = 0:6 to begin with, and then determine
simultaneously ~ and ~h~n. To simplify matters, we set a normalized value ~H = ~h = 1. Let
victimisation probability be about a quarter, ~ = 4 is set, which means ~h~n = 5:5 is solved
for9. In terms of the marginal propensity parameters, C = 1:0 and  = 0:6 are set in
8An alternative measure that is popular in the empirical literature is the use of the average tax rate
derived from revenue statistics at the macro level, as in the IMFs Worldwide Government Revenue
Database. Indeed, for our empirical examination, in order to have a larger sample of countries, the
macro-level tax measures are also used.
9We recognize the limitation that the parameterized equilibrium value, ~ and ~h~n, have a smaller
di¤erence than what we would intuitively assume. However, given the absence of time-use data for
criminal activities, both are parameterized to meet the equilibrium conditions of the model solution,
given other parameters.
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line with annual models with time allocation constraint, such as Imrohoro¼glu et al. (2004,
2006) and Polito and Wickens (2015). Finally, in line with the numbers presented in the
latter, the depreciation rate, , is set at 0:03 while the bond-to-output ratio, b=Y = 0:8.
Given the set of benchmark parameter values, f =  0:825, f = 1:261, fn =  6:625,
fk = 0:816 are calculated. From (28), this means @~=@ > 0, @~=@ c = 0, @~=@n < 0,
and @~=@ k > 0. The equilibrium crime rate increases as the probability of escaping
punishment increases, the labour income tax rate decreases, and the capital income tax
rate increases. For the comparative statics of the equilibrium human capital level ( ~H),
@ ~H=@ < 0, @ ~H=@ c > 0, @ ~H=@n < 0, @ ~H=@ k > 0, and @ ~H=@~ < 0. These mean
that the equilibrium human capital level is higher, the lower the probability of escaping
punishment, the higher the consumption tax, the lower the labour income tax, and the
higher the capital income tax rate. Lastly, we have an inverse relationship between the
equilibrium crime rate and the equilibrium level of human capital. Indeed, the signs of
these comparative statics are stable across the range of most parameter values, save for
the probability of escaping punishment, . For the di¤erent values of , the signs of these
comparative statics are summarized in Table 1, the numerical results of which allow us
to establish:
Proposition 2: There exists a threshold probability, , above which the equilibrium
crime rate, ~, depends positively on the probability of escaping punishment, .
Proposition 3: Above a threshold probability, , labour income tax, n, and capital
income tax,  k, have opposite policy e¤ects on the equilibrium crime rate. Specically,
a rise in capital income tax,  k, or a decline in labour income tax, n, would lead to a
higher equlibrium crime rate.
Proposition 4: There exists a threshold probability, , above which the equilibrium
level of human capital depends positively on consumption tax,  c, and capital income tax,
 k, but negatively on the labour income tax, n.
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5 Endogenous probability and police spending
A natural extension is to endogenize the probability of escaping punishment, , so that
it depends negatively on government expenditure on public security/police, gPt =Yt. This
means @=@vP < 0. In comparison to (27), the only di¤erence for the specication of
gPt =Yt is the constant share of spending, vP , out of the total public expenditure. To
evaluate @~=@vP is relatively straightforward since @~=@vP = (@~=@)(@=@vP ).
Proposition 5: When the probability, , is endogenous to public spending on public
security/police, above a probability threshold , the higher the share of government
spending on public security/police is, the lower the equilibrium crime rate.
However, to re-derive all the comparative statics, we would need to rst specify a





, where 0 2 (0; 1),  > 010. The di¤erence from
the previous implicit function theorem analysis that yields  f=f in (28) is that, the new
f^ and f^ are now given by
f^

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where the terms ~ and  inside the ~gP=Y expression would also have to be accounted for.
Similarly, the new f^c , f^n , and f^kare derived, where the full analytical expressions are
10A more accurate representation would entail specifying an underlying distribution for  and model
the transitional probabilities over time. For the task at hand of providing an extension to the comparative
static analysis, the simplied form presented serves the purposes.
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presented in Appendix A (refer (A49)-(A51)).
Likewise, for the new comparative statics of human capital (partial derivatives with
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respectively, where the relevant partial derivatives are obtained from (34)-(37) and (43).
Based on the same set of parameter values considered in the benchmark analysis,
plus setting vP = 0:1,  = 0:2, and ~gP=Yt = 0:02 (which allows derivation of 0 that
gives  = 0:6), we again numerically evaluate the comparative statics, with key results
summarized in Table 2. The derived Propositions 2-4 from the benchmark case still largely
hold, save for having a slightly di¤erent threshold value for initial . Nevertheless, with
the extension, the change in consumption tax has material e¤ect on the equilibrium crime
rate, in that
Proposition 6: When the probability, , is endogenous to government spending
on public security/police, above a threshold probability, , the equilibrium crime rate
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depends negatively on consumption tax.
We can also derive another proposition that links the signs of the comparative static
e¤ects to the initial level of government spending on public security/police, based on the
numerical evaluations, as follows.
Proposition 7: When the probability, , is endogenous to government spending on
public security/police, there exists a threshold level, (gP=Yt), above which consumption
tax and capital income tax have positive e¤ects on the equilibrium level of human capital.
This proposition essentially implies that, if the long-term public spending on police
(as percentage of GDP) is above a certain threshold level, the use of consumption and
capital income tax to nance this spending could be warranted as it delivers a higher
equilibrium level of human capital.
6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Empirical set-up
Based on (25) and (26), to test the seven derived propositions empirically, we specify a
linearized version of the system for the (;H) pairing, although it is worth noting from
(25) that the former does not depend on the latter. The empirical forms to be tested are
represented by:
jt = 0 + 1jt + 2
2




 lXl;jt + j + ujt;
Hjt = 0 + 1jt + 2jt + 3
2
jt + 4njt + 5 kjt + 6 cjt (46)
+7DebtGDPjt + 8EdugGDPjt +
MX
m=1
 mWm;jt + j + vjt;
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where j(t) is the country (time) index, i(t) refers to the individual observation, EdugGDPjt
is public spending on education (as shares of GDP), DebtGDPjt is the sovereign debt-to-
GDP ratio, fXl;jtgLl=1 and fWm;jtgMm=1 denote the set of control variables commonly used
in the literature of crime and human capital. Specically, fXl;jtgLl=1 include logarithm
of the level of GDP, real GDP growth, urban population share, unemployment rate, and
the share of working age population; and fWm;jtgMm=1include gross secondary enrolment
rate, life expectancy, logarithm of total population, and urban population share.11 j and
j are the time-invariant country-specic e¤ects, and ujt and vjt are random error terms
uncorrelated with the regressors. The square terms of (escape) punishment probability
(2jt) are included given that most of the derived propositions are subject to a threshold
probability, .
For the extension with an endogenized probability of escaping punishment, a simulta-
neous equation set-up that prioritizes endogeneity of the key variables becomes important.
This is especially so when the impacts of crime and human capital on economic growth
are also assessed. We therefore estimate an extended system in which two additional
equations are added to (45) and (46). These are:





 qZq;jt + j + "jt; (47)
gjt = 0 + 1Hjt + 2H
2
jt + 3jt +
RX
r=1
 r	r;jt +$j + &jt; (48)
where (47) estimates the probability, , as a function of government expenditure on public
order and safety (percentage of GDP), its square term (to account for the threshold in
Proposition 7 ), and fZq;jtgQq=1, a set of demographic variables as controls. (48) models
GDP growth rate as a function of the crime rate (jt), level of human capital (Hjt)
11See, for instance, Gaviria and Pagés (2002), Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013), and Goulas and
Zervoyianni (2015).
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and its square term, and f	r;jtgRr=1 set of control variables commonly used in growth
regressions (investment, trade openness, ination rate).12 While not being the main focus,
the estimation of the GDP growth equation allows us to verify whether the choice of using
a bounded human capital, AK-form specication applied in the theoretical model of this
paper (for which then, we would expect 1 and 2 to be insignicant while the coe¢ cient
for physical capital investment will be highly signicant) is consistent with the empirical
evidence.
6.2 Data, variables, and empirical limitations
We construct an unbalanced dataset containing information on crime, human capital,
tax rates, economic growth, government spending variables, and other macroeconomic
and demographic variables. While we started o¤ with a full sample across 98 economies
and 40-years period of 1976-2015 by extracting the data from the various waves of the
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-
CTS)13, the relevant statistics on thefts and robberies are lled with gaps and missing
observations. As such, many observations drop out and we are left with an actual sample
of 1008 observations across 63 economies and 15-years period of 1991-2005 to be used for
the empirical estimation.
For the tax rates variables, the average measures are obtained from the tax revenue
statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while marginal tax rates are ob-
tained from the OECD Tax Statistics database. For human capital, we use the human
capital index in the Penn World Tables 9.0, which is based on Psacharopoulos (1994) and
12Given that (45)-(48) are jointly estimated as a system, the four key policy parameters (, n, k,
 c) are not included as direct regressors in the equation for GDP growth, as their e¤ects on growth are
specied to be indirectly through human capital and crime. The inclusion of the square term for human
capital is intended to control for any threshold e¤ect.
13Technically, the rst wave of the UN-CTS survey was from 1970-75. Nevertheless, many variables of
interest, such as the prosecution and conviction statistics by the di¤erent category of criminal activities,
are not available.
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Barro and Lee (2013). The government spending variables, which include expenditure
on education, and public order and safety, are obtained from IMFs Government Finance
Statistics database. The GDP level and growth rates, and the remaining control variables
are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators and the IMFs World
Economic Outlook database.
To be consistent with the description of crime, , in the model, we use both the total
recorded theft and robbery rates (per 100,000 population), which also provide means
to assess whether di¤erences in the aggression level would a¤ect the estimation results.
For the probability of avoiding punishment, , given the limited data on arrest only
available in the earliest wave of UN-CTS surveys we use recorded prosecution cases,
and supplemented it with recorded convictions for the robustness check. Specically,  is
proxied by one minus the proportion of prosecuted/convicted (of total recorded) cases for
the specic category of theft and robbery. For the three tax rate variables, to account for
the well-documented shortcoming of average tax rates derived from government revenue
data (see Gemmell et al. (2014))14, we consider both the average tax rates (percent of
GDP) and the marginal tax rates. For the former, labour income tax, n, is proxied
by personal income tax revenue (percent of GDP), capital income tax,  k, by corporate
income tax revenue (percent of GDP), and consumption tax,  c, by goods and services
tax (GST) revenue (percent of GDP). For marginal rates, we use the OECD dataset and
therefore have a much smaller sample of economies. The mid-personal income tax rate is
used as a proxy for marginal labour income tax, the adjusted statutory corporate income
tax rate as a proxy for marginal capital income tax, and the adjusted standard GST tax
rate as a proxy for marginal consumption tax. The denition and sources of these and
all the other variables used in the empirical analysis, as well as the set of countries, are
14Gemmell et al. (2014) argue that, the commonly used average tax rates are derived from macro-, tax
revenue data and therefore ought to not have any behavioural implication on the agents dened in any
theoretical model. In contrast, marginal tax rates are by denition, micro in nature. The use of marginal
tax rates is therefore better suited for economic interpretation.
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presented in Appendix B, with the summary statistics presented in Table 3.
In terms of econometric strategy, a common practice in cross-country regressions is to
take the xed e¤ects (FE) estimator for granted, which does not apply in this instance.
Indeed, as seen later, for many of the regressions, the Hausman test indicates that the
extra orthogonality conditions imposed by a random-e¤ect (RE) estimator are valid. We
suspect this to be largely due to the relatively small sample of observations within some
of the panel (economies), once the standard growth regression practice of taking 5-year
averages (to lter out business cycle e¤ects) is implemented. For instance, in some of the
regressions implemented, the average number of observations is as low as 2:3. However,
given that all the propositions are derived in the long-run context of steady-state equilib-
rium, this is a necessary procedure. By implication, the small T problem also prevents us
from implementing the standard system-GMM estimator. While the issue of endogeneity
(over time) is largely overcome by taking 5-year averages and so partly mitigating the
aforementioned shortcomings15, as a robustness check, we opt to examine both the RE-
and FE-estimated results for (45) and (46) because it is the sign rather than the precise
value of the estimates in which we are most interested. Further, given the mixed results,
based on the superior estimator identied (a RE-estimator is preferred if the Hausman test
gives a P-value above 5 percent; a FE-estimator is preferred if the opposite is true), the
implied threshold value is calculated for each regression and a further threshold regression
with restricted sample is implemented. To account for the endogeneity of human capital,
crime rate, and (escape) punishment probability, for the growth regression based on the
long-run context of steady-state equilibrium, we implement a three-stage-least-squares
(3SLS) procedure, controlling for country and time xed e¤ects, to jointly estimate the
four equations.
15The gap between two consecutive observations is t = 5 years, which is a su¢ cient gap to lter out
most of the endogeneity through serial correlations, hence making the needs of adding lagged variables
as instruments unnecessary.
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Overall, the proposed empirical strategy is by design, building in some robustness
checks as the estimations are implemented not just by using di¤erent econometric meth-
ods, but also by using di¤erent measures for punishment (prosecution and conviction),
tax rates (average versus marginal taxes), and crime (theft and robbery).
6.3 Empirical results
The results for the crime equation, (45) are presented in Tables 4 and 5, and the results
for the human capital equation, (46) are presented in Tables 6 and 7. We evaluate Propo-
sitions 1-4, derived from the benchmark model, primarily on the basis of these results.
The 3SLS estimation results for the four-equations, endogenous system (with endogenous
punishment probability) are presented in Tables 8 and 9. We evaluate Propositions 5-7
using these results.
6.3.1 Crime equation
While we have mixed statistical signicance, Proposition 2 is largely conrmed by the
results. Specically, there exists a threshold probability, , above which the equilibrium
crime rate, ~, depends positively on the probability of escaping punishment, . 12 out of 16
of the estimated regressions imply a U-shape (^1 negative and ^2 positive), with threshold
values ranging between 0:389   0:781. Indeed, if we were to ignore the convinction data
and focus only on the prosecution data, the range of  would narrow to 0:609   0:641.
These are much higher than the implied threshold values documented in Neanidis and
Papadopoulou (2013). This suggests that, if human capital and tax considerations were
to be accounted for, and that crime involvement is the outcome of an optimal choice
(which is the case with our model), the threshold probability of escaping punishment
would have to be much higher for the direct positive relationship with crime to set in.
This is intuitively reasonable. The statistical signicance of the positive relationship above
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the threshold  is well-established, as all but one of the estimated threshold values in
Tables 4 and 5 are signicant and positive at the 10 percent level.
In terms of taxes, Proposition 3 states that, above a threshold probability, , labour
income tax, n, and capital income tax,  k, have opposite policy e¤ects on the equilibrium
crime rate. Thus, a rise in capital income tax,  k, or a decline in labour income tax, n,
would lead to a higher equlibrium crime rate. While statistical signicance remains an
issue, we notice signicantly di¤erent results between the use of average tax rates and
the marginal tax rates, à la Gemmell et al. (2014). Based on the estimated results
in Tables 4 and 5, for the capital income tax,  k, we observe predominantly positive
estimates for ^4 when marginal tax rates are used, while negative estimates are observed
when average tax rates are used. Given that our numerical parameterization is based
on the marginal corporate tax rate of the G7 economies, and that marginal tax rates
tend to be more suitable for behavioural interpretation, the positive e¤ect of marginal
 k on crime is consistent with Proposition 3, albeit with limited statistical signicance.
For labour income tax, n, although the estimated signs are mixed, we do generally
observe opposite e¤ects of n on crime rate when compared to those for  k. Moreover,
the estimated coe¢ cients for ^3 are mainly negative when marginal tax rates are used,
which is consistent with the prediction of Proposition 3.
For consumption tax,  c, Proposition 1 states the independence of the equilibrium
crime rate from the e¤ects of consumption tax. The proposition was not supported,
as the estimated coe¢ cients for ^5 have a mixture of signs and are mostly statistically
insignicant. No consistent patterns are discernable. The may likely reect inherent
di¢ culties in nding a good empirical proxy that is a pure representation of a direct tax
on householdsconsumption: in practice, the commonly used GST/VAT rates would also
apply to intermediate goods and services.
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6.3.2 Human capital equation
Proposition 4 concerns the existence of a threshold probability above which the equi-
librium level of human capital is positively related to consumption tax,  c, and capital
income tax,  k, but negatively related to the labour income tax, n. Based on the es-
timated coe¢ cients of ^2 and ^3 in Tables 6 and 7, we observe a threshold e¤ect of ,
though statistical signicance remains mixed. Further, unlike the crime equation, the re-
gressions with restricted sample above the implied threshold also give a mixture of signs
too, hence the results for the relationship between  and human capital are inconclusive.
In regards to the consumption tax,  c, there is some empirical support. Most estimated
coe¢ cients of ^6 are positive, albeit at poor statistical signicance again. However, in the
benchmark regression with prosecution data and average tax rates as proxies (see Table
6), we have reasonable statistical signicance, with both the regressions with sample above
the implied threshold value yield an estimates (0.017 and 0.019) that are signicant at
the ten percent level. In terms of the estimated coe¢ cients for labour income tax, ^4,
contrasting results are again observed between the regressions using average tax rates and
those using marginal tax rates. The proposition, @ ~H=@n < 0 , holds when we model
n using marginal income tax rates, and all but two of the estimates are statistically
signicant at the ten percent level. Yet, when the tax revenue data-calculated average
tax rate is used, we obtain signicant positive estimates. Given that the marginal tax rate
provides the more appropriate interpretation, we have a comparatively robust verication.
Lastly, results relating to the capital income tax,  k, are essentially random and cannot
be veried by data.
6.3.3 Endogenous probability and growth
Tables 8 and 9 present the 3SLS-estimated results of the four linearized equations that
are consistent with the stationary equilibrium of the model. The ndings associated with
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Propositions 1-4 largely hold. We therefore focus on evaluating Propositions 5, 6, and 7,
which are only applicable when the probability, , is endogenous to public spending on
police (proxied by the government expenditure on public order and security).
First, Proposition 5 is not directly testable using our empirical form. However, we
can indirectly test the proposition by using a combination of the estimates for 1, 2 (refer
Proposition 2) and 1, 2. Six of the eight pairs of estimates (^1, ^2) are consistent with
Proposition 2, which means we have a U-shape, where above the implied threshold level,
the equilibrium crime rate is higher, the higher the probability of escaping punishment
is. To be in consistent with Proposition 5, which states a positive relationship between
equilibrium crime rate and the spending on police, we need to observe an inverted-U
shaped curve between the spending and probability variables. Even though the statistical
signicance associated with the estimated results using conviction data in Table 9 are
very poor, overall, we do have a consistent combination of positive and negative estimates
for ^1 and ^2 in all the regressions, with good statistical signicance for the robbery-data
based estimates in Table 8.
Indeed, the estimated threshold for the level of government expenditure on public
order and security is in the range 0:133  0:333. This can be narrowed to 0:133  0:162 if
we ignore the relatively insignicant estimates using conviction data. The establishment
of the threshold level leads us to Proposition 7: consumption tax and capital income tax
have positive e¤ects on the equilibrium level of human capital when the endogeneity of
the (escape) punishment probability is modelled. All but two of the estimated coe¢ cients
for ^6 are positive. Again, if we rule out estimates using conviction data (Table 9), we
have consistently signicant positive estimates for the relationship between consumption
tax and the equilibrium level of human capital. In terms of capital income tax, overall
statistical signicance is an issue again despite a predominantly positive signs for the
estimated ^5. Nevertheless, if we were to focus only on the regressions using prosecution
and marginal tax rates data, then we have some empirical signicance for the positive
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coe¢ cients, and therefore Proposition 7.
The growth regression of (48) is implemented primarily to investigate our choice in
using an AK-framework (instead of Lucas type where output grows at the same constant
rate as human capital) is supported by empirical data. Indeed, the estimated coe¢ cients
associated with private investment are consistently signicant in the growth equation,
whereas the e¤ects (both level and threshold) of human capital are neither statistically
signicant nor consistently positive. As such, our choice of modelling human capital as
a time-bounded productivity factor and using an AK-framework in deriving endogenous
growth is backed by empirical evidence.
7 Concluding Remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a macroeconomic model with crime, human
capital, and various taxation policies. In an extension, we endogenize the (escape) punish-
ment probability usually treated as exogenous to depend on government expenditure
on public security/police. The addition of taxation and police spending improves upon ex-
isting literature on the macroeconomics of crime by allowing an expanded scope of policy
analysis. The model is solved analytically and numerically to obtain propositions, which
are then tested empirically using cross-country data. The main ndings are summarized
in the paper and need not be repeated here. Instead, we conclude by reviewing some of
the shortcomings and how these might be improved upon.
The relatively small number of observations used for many of the estimated equa-
tions prevents the implementation of instrumented econometric approach using lagged
variables when empirically testing the propositions. As the UN-CTS dataset and the
tax databases expand their coverage over time, the representativeness of these estimates
would eventually improve as we get to employ more sophisticated econometric techniques.
Second, while we have introduced additional scal variables (labour income taxes, capital
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income taxes, consumption taxes, government expenditure on education, government ex-
penditure on police) in this model and therefore has room for much richer policy analysis
compared to previous studies in the crime literature, the specication of public debts is
largely simplied. This means the implications of public debt dynamics on these policy
variables cannot be properly analyzed. Third, the main priority in this paper is on ana-
lyzing the stationary equilibrium of the model. As such, we do not examine the dynamics
of crime and its implications on the dynamics be it permanent or temporary of other
variables. Indeed, this issue is examined in much details in Jia and Lim (2018), who de-
velop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of crime with di¤erential
human capital in a monetary economy. Given that the present literature on the economic
analysis of crime remains largely independent from the nancial and monetary sides of
the economy, despite the original seminal contribution of Becker (1968) having empha-
sized criminal involvements being a function of the expected monetary returns, studies
examining the interactions of criminal activity and macroeconomic policy management
provide potential avenues for future research.
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Table 1
Summary of the Comparative Static Results: Di¤erent Initial Values of 
 @~=@ @~=@ c @~=@n @~=@ k @ ~H=@ @ ~H=@ c @ ~H=@n @ ~H=@ k @ ~H=@~
0:1 -ve 0 +ve -ve -ve -ve +ve +ve +ve
0:2 -ve 0 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve +ve +ve
0:3 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve +ve
0:4 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:5 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:6 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:7 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:8 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:9 +ve 0 -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
Table 2
Endogenous : Summary of the Comparative Static Results
@^=@ @^=@ c @^=@n @^=@ k @H^=@ @H^=@ c @H^=@n @H^=@ k @H^=@^
~gP=Y
0:02 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve
0:04 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:06 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:08 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:10 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
vP
0:05 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
0:10 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve
0:15 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve
0:20 +ve -ve -ve +ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve
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Variables Mean Std Dev. Min Max Obs
Crime rate:
Theft 1,244.312 1,530.025 0.221 8,772.341 2,100     
Robbery 92.354 181.285 0.044 2,141.068 2,124     
Punishment probability:
Prosecution
Theft 0.738 0.227 0.025 1.000 657        
Robbery 0.623 0.248 0.009 1.000 645        
Conviction
Theft 0.821 0.181 0.091 1.000 839        
Robbery 0.701 0.232 0.000 0.998 913        
Human Capital 2.513 0.636 1.066 3.734 3,211     
Average tax rates:
Personal income tax 5.071 4.676 0.001 27.341 1,765     
Corporate income tax 2.901 2.082 0.007 25.506 1,864     
Goods & services tax 8.695 3.942 0.034 31.027 2,002     
Marginal tax rates:
Personal income tax 4.939 0.045 0.637 22.545 1,035     
Corporate income tax 32.536 10.966 8.500 61.750 1,029     
Goods & services tax 17.619 5.213 3.000 27.000 1,030     
Gross debt/ GDP 53.263 34.234 0.062 260.964 2,029     
Spending on public order & safety 1.501 1.178 0.000 20.258 1,158     
Spending on education 4.450 1.516 0.000 10.679 2,032     
Gross enrolment rate, secondary 81.146 27.319 2.282 166.808 2,886     
Logarithm of output 4.763 1.897 -1.398 9.817 3,448     
Urban population 60.532 21.567 3.678 100.000 3,679     
Unemployment rate 8.300 5.630 0.200 37.300 2,275     
Working-age population 63.282 5.991 47.354 85.872 3,679     
Life expectancy 70.734 7.660 43.172 84.278 3,679     
Logarithm of total population 2.319 1.771 -1.962 7.222 3,350     
Investment 22.923 6.277 2.647 65.560 3,198     
Trade 80.975 56.312 8.385 442.620 3,271     
Inflation 29.424 293.310 -23.822 11,749.640 3,231     











Probability of escape, π -2576.235 -1728.636 4227.513 -64.809 -53.551 227.234 5057.044 -60237.620 3680.351 -134.168 -34.906 308.108
(0.203) (0.580) (0.001) (0.291) (0.244) (0.000) (0.290) (0.106) (0.056) (0.075) (0.564) (0.002)
Escape probability squared, π2 3300.782 2303.402 81.606 61.780 -1017.213 40310.160 194.363 42.485
(0.061) (0.353) (0.149) (0.196) (0.799) (0.099) (0.044) (0.591)
Labour income tax, πn 188.828 95.539 202.457 0.218 4.948 3.209 -58.661 81.206 -63.066 -0.060 0.151 0.721
(0.000) (0.589) (0.000) (0.943) (0.242) (0.449) (0.433) (0.566) (0.379) (0.970) (0.923) (0.794)
Capital income tax, πk -39.348 -158.805 -26.477 -1.786 -1.057 -22.235 20.518 29.932 20.043 0.263 1.107 0.075
(0.685) (0.322) (0.844) (0.488) (0.700) (0.000) (0.411) (0.080) (0.421) (0.666) (0.062) (0.892)
Consumption tax, πc 78.145 148.389 71.457 -0.340 -1.079 -2.941 116.442 -426.034 116.556 -1.379 6.181 -6.767
(0.099) (0.260) (0.244) (0.865) (0.567) (0.351) (0.059) (0.369) (0.053) (0.654) (0.155) (0.271)
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio -3.367 -8.985 -5.352 -0.055 0.127 0.757 -8.025 -23.484 -7.683 0.029 0.201 2.184
(0.361) (0.509) (0.241) (0.767) (0.547) (0.220) (0.494) (0.426) (0.509) (0.917) (0.471) (0.000)
Logarithm of GDP 228.666 1416.796 229.508 -0.207 -34.507 -18.084 447.515 1380.843 436.972 -8.437 -157.736 -380.984
(0.032) (0.590) (0.095) (0.983) (0.467) (0.324) (0.106) (0.754) (0.093) (0.570) (0.065) (0.004)
Real GDP growth -499.187 -1744.801 148.131 47.469 44.103 201.796 -107.479 -2439.176 -85.631 4.896 -34.809 29.782
(0.250) (0.219) (0.803) (0.071) (0.138) (0.001) (0.940) (0.265) (0.953) (0.875) (0.334) (0.358)
Urban population -2.426 -80.392 -7.135 0.926 1.697 2.340 50.536 -130.336 49.812 -0.064 2.185 2.750
(0.751) (0.671) (0.565) (0.344) (0.399) (0.086) (0.008) (0.563) (0.008) (0.961) (0.313) (0.245)
Unemployment rate 1.640 67.702 1.369 1.482 -0.155 -0.142 86.830 153.583 81.365 0.285 -2.285 -13.285
(0.947) (0.476) (0.967) (0.414) (0.945) (0.969) (0.253) (0.340) (0.304) (0.881) (0.402) (0.000)
Working-age population -27.078 64.643 -22.118 -2.409 -0.189 1.065 42.950 -144.530 38.834 -0.953 14.165 20.657
(0.474) (0.628) (0.689) (0.168) (0.953) (0.644) (0.733) (0.705) (0.760) (0.802) (0.061) (0.013)
Country Effect No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 52/94 52/94 43/72 51/97 51/97 34/56 27/59 27/59 27/59 26/62 26/62 18/39
Overall R2 0.688 0.109 0.647 0.151 0.001 0.015 0.412 0.004 0.421 0.314 0.010 0.005
Hausman test (p-value)
Threshold value 0.641 0.641 0.630 0.630 0.101 0.101 0.609 0.609
Parantheses denote p-values. The test statistics are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
The implied threshold value from the RE-estimator is selected if the p-value of Hausman test is above >0.05. The corresponding threshold regression is then also implemented with RE, vise versa for FE.
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Table 4
Results for Benchmark Model with Exogenous π, Crime Equation
(one-way FE and RE models, plus restricted threshold model)
Prosecution rate as proxy







Probability of escape, π -13615.120 2707.953 1898.134 -276.873 -531.361 553.462 -18130.050 -3913.518 1716.858 3240.293 3616.233 888.541
(0.017) (0.794) (0.004) (0.119) (0.289) (0.001) (0.167) (0.895) (0.168) (0.326) (0.196) (0.033)
Escape probability squared, π2 10471.600 -1164.332 432.530 999.333 13013.400 1542.848 -1832.261 -1976.135
(0.009) (0.872) (0.018) (0.173) (0.144) (0.930) (0.391) (0.268)
Labour income tax, πn 158.807 -94.863 158.751 -4.130 9.361 2.370 -22.891 190.408 -27.475 4.875 -3.498 -5.504
(0.000) (0.542) (0.001) (0.335) (0.181) (0.693) (0.700) (0.182) (0.649) (0.511) (0.365) (0.182)
Capital income tax, πk -9.363 -35.169 -16.427 -1.645 -2.977 -2.986 3.983 24.211 7.226 -0.861 1.004 0.075
(0.928) (0.722) (0.881) (0.731) (0.633) (0.310) (0.898) (0.200) (0.803) (0.617) (0.577) (0.956)
Consumption tax, πc 85.204 52.100 72.793 1.927 -3.927 -7.955 70.948 -254.774 59.216 6.237 48.287 46.270
(0.110) (0.601) (0.158) (0.635) (0.671) (0.019) (0.200) (0.507) (0.297) (0.343) (0.049) (0.091)
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio -2.199 -6.091 -1.282 -0.554 0.315 -0.004 -5.308 -0.153 -3.017 -0.674 0.373 0.495
(0.526) (0.537) (0.711) (0.017) (0.657) (0.992) (0.552) (0.993) (0.736) (0.113) (0.666) (0.631)
Logarithm of GDP 195.645 3867.592 212.907 2.626 -273.103 -26.639 441.569 6696.917 462.310 9.983 -495.357 -491.672
(0.134) (0.087) (0.114) (0.771) (0.142) (0.081) (0.036) (0.082) (0.032) (0.575) (0.070) (0.072)
Real GDP growth -451.868 -1385.473 -544.504 -11.383 -6.812 10.007 -1298.794 -2989.070 -912.967 54.092 -62.507 -153.576
(0.303) (0.187) (0.245) (0.845) (0.898) (0.800) (0.425) (0.107) (0.525) (0.602) (0.702) (0.185)
Urban population 6.754 -283.819 12.288 0.869 1.965 1.919 24.112 -381.909 23.267 0.675 -0.351 -3.290
(0.542) (0.156) (0.258) (0.493) (0.749) (0.399) (0.204) (0.119) (0.239) (0.773) (0.964) (0.679)
Unemployment rate -0.449 99.340 -0.582 4.769 -14.101 -2.689 -46.096 195.383 -40.081 3.764 -18.364 -21.749
(0.988) (0.289) (0.984) (0.067) (0.161) (0.353) (0.444) (0.190) (0.505) (0.498) (0.042) (0.062)
Working-age population -29.392 -132.353 -44.316 0.239 19.109 5.676 -205.850 -362.165 -220.564 -0.451 51.059 59.190
(0.536) (0.263) (0.340) (0.949) (0.130) (0.146) (0.079) (0.254) (0.065) (0.965) (0.030) (0.016)
Country Effect No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 57/102 57/102 57/102 54/105 54/105 29/48 31/66 31/66 31/66 30/69 30/69 30/69
Overall R2 0.627 0.006 0.598 0.221 0.000 0.178 0.457 0.010 0.426 0.077 0.018 0.019
Hausman test (p-value)
Threshold value 0.385 0.385 0.781 0.781 0.359 0.359 0.273 0.273
Parantheses denote p-values. The test statistics are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
The implied threshold value from the RE-estimator is selected if the p-value of Hausman test is above >0.05. The corresponding threshold regression is then also implemented with RE, vise versa for FE.
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Table 5
Results for Benchmark Model with Exogenous π, Crime Equation
(one-way FE and RE models, plus restricted threshold model)
Conviction rate as proxy







Crime rate, θ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.228) (0.036) (0.237) (0.238) (0.012) (0.024) (0.532) (0.034) (0.525) (0.079) (0.018) (0.001)
Probability of escape, π 0.162 0.185 -0.033 0.123 0.122 0.141 -0.087 0.324 0.023 0.368 0.316 -0.129
(0.235) (0.290) (0.584) (0.125) (0.296) (0.267) (0.855) (0.650) (0.468) (0.004) (0.054) (0.265)
Escape probability squared, π2 -0.118 -0.142 -0.145 -0.090 0.072 -0.208 -0.377 -0.286
(0.250) (0.275) (0.101) (0.405) (0.817) (0.662) (0.003) (0.073)
Labour income tax, πn 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.029 0.023 0.024 -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.673) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009)
Capital income tax, πk -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.088) (0.176) (0.123) (0.418) (0.895) (0.843) (0.656) (0.602) (0.833) (0.881) (0.783) (0.469)
Consumption tax, πc 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.019 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.015
(0.036) (0.297) (0.069) (0.013) (0.110) (0.038) (0.809) (0.712) (0.476) (0.610) (0.406) (0.306)
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.235) (0.192) (0.233) (0.514) (0.619) (0.627) (0.470) (0.878) (0.349) (0.986) (0.495) (0.228)
Education expenditure -0.013 -0.002 -0.013 -0.024 -0.022 -0.028 0.005 0.008 0.000 -0.011 -0.009 -0.013
(0.303) (0.843) (0.313) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.353) (0.170) (0.942) (0.415) (0.441) (0.308)
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.526) (0.089) (0.554) (0.332) (0.026) (0.090) (0.920) (0.209) (0.733) (0.494) (0.276) (0.303)
Urban population 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.034 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.025) (0.056) (0.050) (0.114) (0.503) (0.604) (0.721) (0.117) (0.000) (0.778) (0.959) (0.675)
Life expectancy 0.032 0.024 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.032 0.035 0.019
(0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.001) (0.038) (0.113) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.053) (0.274)
Logarithm of total population 0.025 -0.377 0.026 0.047 -0.310 -0.447 -0.012 -0.944 -0.011 -0.018 -0.796 -0.665
(0.572) (0.283) (0.582) (0.234) (0.277) (0.126) (0.851) (0.003) (0.865) (0.767) (0.068) (0.118)
Country Effect No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 48/93 48/93 46/88 47/98 47/99 42/83 27/67 27/67 26/66 26/71 26/71 24/60
Overall R2 0.341 0.076 0.342 0.365 0.017 0.005 0.073 0.003 0.071 0.007 0.007 0.014
Hausman test (p-value)
Threshold value 0.366 0.366 0.369 0.369 0.418 0.418 0.453 0.453
Parantheses denote p-values. The test statistics are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
The implied threshold value from the RE-estimator is selected if the p-value of Hausman test is above >0.05. The corresponding threshold regression is then also implemented with RE, vise versa for FE.
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Table 6
Results for Benchmark Model with Exogenous π, Human Capital Equation
(one-way FE and RE models, plus restricted threshold model)
Prosecution rate as proxy







Crime rate, θ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.045) (0.001) (0.000) (0.738) (0.763) (0.875) (0.087) (0.003) (0.001) (0.462) (0.732) (0.178)
Probability of escape, π 0.830 0.602 -0.033 0.342 0.470 0.116 0.072 -0.165 0.076 0.489 0.629 -0.054
(0.074) (0.237) (0.682) (0.097) (0.034) (0.476) (0.943) (0.821) (0.358) (0.087) (0.016) (0.696)
Escape probability squared, π2 -0.656 -0.426 -0.237 -0.196 -0.105 0.157 -0.304 -0.352
(0.037) (0.223) (0.315) (0.331) (0.870) (0.739) (0.307) (0.116)
Labour income tax, πn 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.017 0.015 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005
(0.031) (0.240) (0.238) (0.008) (0.058) (0.139) (0.079) (0.034) (0.021) (0.030) (0.077) (0.202)
Capital income tax, πk -0.014 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.026) (0.119) (0.167) (0.221) (0.423) (0.507) (0.604) (0.783) (0.790) (0.607) (0.846) (0.661)
Consumption tax, πc 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.011 -0.004 0.000 -0.004
(0.950) (0.763) (0.682) (0.289) (0.598) (0.910) (0.761) (0.122) (0.149) (0.675) (0.963) (0.670)
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.482) (0.477) (0.473) (0.824) (0.427) (0.666) (0.512) (0.927) (0.890) (0.948) (0.635) (0.986)
Education expenditure -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.032 -0.020 -0.017 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.005 -0.004
(0.290) (0.720) (0.663) (0.020) (0.076) (0.131) (0.653) (0.669) (0.651) (0.328) (0.647) (0.685)
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.637) (0.767) (0.679) (0.437) (0.921) (0.815) (0.751) (0.168) (0.173) (0.530) (0.961) (0.948)
Urban population 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006
(0.011) (0.032) (0.044) (0.072) (0.533) (0.825) (0.258) (0.005) (0.005) (0.690) (0.746) (0.238)
Life expectancy 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.001 -0.014 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.015 0.002 -0.022
(0.002) (0.085) (0.108) (0.016) (0.936) (0.631) (0.177) (0.038) (0.040) (0.341) (0.899) (0.288)
Logarithm of total population 0.016 -0.677 -0.687 0.008 -0.627 -0.660 -0.007 -1.341 -1.332 -0.049 -1.102 -1.091
(0.677) (0.032) (0.026) (0.851) (0.067) (0.121) (0.912) (0.000) (0.000) (0.377) (0.009) (0.004)
Country Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 53/108 53/108 53/108 51/111 51/111 49/102 31/79 31/79 31/78 31/83 31/83 29/77
Overall R2 0.335 0.036 0.033 0.386 0.009 0.000 0.1036 0.0048 0.006 0.102 0.009 0.036
Hausman test (p-value)
Threshold value 0.354 0.354 0.209 0.209 0.474 0.474 0.280 0.280
Parantheses denote p-values. The test statistics are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
The implied threshold value from the RE-estimator is selected if the p-value of Hausman test is above >0.05. The corresponding threshold regression is then also implemented with RE, vise versa for FE.
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Table 7
Results for Benchmark Model with Exogenous π, Human Capital Equation
(one-way FE and RE models, plus restricted threshold model)
Conviction rate as proxy
Crime Human Capital Probability Growth Crime
Human 
Capital Probability Growth Crime
Human 
Capital Probability Growth Crime
Human 
Capital Probability Growth
Crime rate, θ 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.470) (0.000) (0.058) (0.588) (0.403) (0.893) (0.566) (0.520)
Probability of escape, π -4745.524 4.083 -627.030 1.808 14122.670 4.892 -842.260 1.349
(0.331) (0.046) (0.054) (0.153) (0.116) (0.002) (0.003) (0.060)
Escape probability squared, π2 6029.031 -3.017 723.963 -1.527 -6884.327 -3.343 1089.000 -1.339
(0.115) (0.069) (0.019) (0.226) (0.286) (0.003) (0.000) (0.050)
Labour income tax, πn 142.732 -0.015 -7.683 -0.009 -10959.430 0.001 -191.627 1.013
(0.000) (0.344) (0.015) (0.527) (0.186) (0.999) (0.613) (0.305)
Capital income tax, πk -28.760 0.015 -24.194 -0.001 59.717 0.021 -4.140 0.015
(0.793) (0.646) (0.006) (0.985) (0.062) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Consumption tax, πc 99.692 0.060 2.188 0.073 160.208 0.024 -7.767 0.016
(0.162) (0.002) (0.710) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.024)
Human capiral 0.158 0.128 -2.393 -2.539
(0.831) (0.870) (0.127) (0.164)
Human capital, squared -0.077 -0.054 0.319 0.350
(0.556) (0.691) (0.199) (0.224)
Expenditure on public order & security 0.209 0.354 0.212 0.408
(0.230) (0.095) (0.178) (0.045)
POS expenditure, squared -0.056 -0.115 -0.065 -0.109
(0.167) (0.021) (0.063) (0.018)
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio -0.761 -0.004 -1.033 -0.005 -1.294 -0.003 -0.616 -0.002
(0.904) (0.027) (0.022) (0.001) (0.893) (0.013) (0.115) (0.088)
Education expenditure 0.026 -0.001 0.119 0.037
(0.638) (0.985) (0.011) (0.281)
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary 0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005
(0.324) (0.594) (0.025) (0.050)
Logarithm of GDP 287.686 0.023 6.653 0.021 619.720 0.033 -19.501 0.018
(0.015) (0.137) (0.525) (0.186) (0.001) (0.001) (0.133) (0.113)
Real GDP growth -153.730 -184.252 -919.813 -490.997
(0.862) (0.021) (0.680) (0.000)
Unemployment rate 33.660 -3.383 7.911 -2.899
(0.354) (0.240) (0.902) (0.309)
Working-age population -53.795 -6.254 -134.363 10.067
(0.311) (0.254) (0.262) (0.209)
Urban population 5.974 0.001 0.003 0.891 0.006 0.002 41.263 0.001 0.002 -2.415 0.003 0.005
(0.635) (0.885) (0.231) (0.428) (0.103) (0.512) (0.069) (0.737) (0.410) (0.037) (0.383) (0.172)
Life expectancy 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.018 0.026 0.022 0.012 0.027
(0.170) (0.002) (0.035) (0.068) (0.121) (0.059) (0.370) (0.057)
Logarithm of total population 0.161 -0.011 0.184 -0.006 0.174 -0.006 0.102 0.010
(0.000) (0.571) (0.000) (0.773) (0.000) (0.746) (0.000) (0.659)
Investment 0.020 0.011 0.013 0.012
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.546) (0.848) (0.045) (0.343)
Inflation -0.001 -0.002 -0.016 -0.014
(0.256) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57 57 57 57 61 61 61 61 41 41 41 41 45 45 45 45
Adjusted R2 0.754 0.497 0.346 0.423 0.460 0.461 0.297 0.336 0.661 0.528 0.368 0.722 0.449 0.625 0.386 0.566
Implied threshold values 0.635 0.369 0.135 0.577 0.422 0.162 0.244 0.342 0.152 0.646 0.496 0.133
Parantheses denote p-values. 
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Table 8
Three-stage-least squares (3SLS) estimation results for the system of 4 equations, with endogenous π
Prosecution rate as proxy
Average Tax Rates Marginal Tax Rates
Crime Human Capital Probability Growth Crime
Human 
Capital Probability Growth Crime
Human 
Capital Probability Growth Crime
Human 
Capital Probability Growth
Crime rate, θ 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.656) (0.000) (0.366)
Probability of escape, π -69207.500 34.885 -856.351 10.736 -29391.870 14.721 505.831 4.738
(0.000) (0.000) (0.477) (0.001) (0.098) (0.000) (0.831) (0.345)
Escape probability squared, π2 46982.430 -23.665 854.049 -6.818 19861.100 -9.917 -339.794 -2.429
(0.000) (0.000) (0.355) (0.003) (0.083) (0.000) (0.839) (0.483)
Labour income tax, πn 151.944 -0.057 -5.780 -0.012 -2785.856 0.466 1.553 0.897
(0.000) (0.002) (0.121) (0.502) (0.753) (0.790) (0.998) (0.595)
Capital income tax, πk -83.636 0.072 -10.908 -0.067 17.839 0.009 -2.252 -0.001
(0.573) (0.162) (0.357) (0.154) (0.558) (0.122) (0.455) (0.856)
Consumption tax, πc 186.589 -0.091 3.993 0.057 100.232 -0.032 1.755 0.005
(0.018) (0.001) (0.569) (0.027) (0.035) (0.000) (0.665) (0.618)
Human capiral -1.054 -0.671 0.125 -0.289
(0.103) (0.308) (0.902) (0.781)
Human capital, squared 0.130 0.092 -0.057 0.017
(0.249) (0.415) (0.727) (0.917)
Expenditure on public order & security 0.016 0.028 -0.013 0.037
(0.836) (0.743) (0.852) (0.563)
POS expenditure, squared -0.007 -0.018 -0.003 -0.012
(0.726) (0.421) (0.859) (0.510)
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio -5.845 -0.001 -0.192 -0.009 -0.034 0.000 -0.823 -0.003
(0.442) (0.568) (0.768) (0.000) (0.997) (0.936) (0.276) (0.089)
Education expenditure -0.010 -0.040 -0.101 -0.055
(0.844) (0.538) (0.090) (0.249)
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.965) (0.226) (0.727) (0.680)
Logarithm of GDP 268.218 0.008 -10.080 0.011 394.658 0.014 33.597 0.002
(0.022) (0.597) (0.586) (0.480) (0.023) (0.161) (0.112) (0.853)
Real GDP growth -2705.012 365.069 -5684.741 630.271
(0.024) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006)
Unemployment rate -2.913 6.230 -124.137 5.145
(0.901) (0.044) (0.002) (0.156)
Working-age population 75.332 11.853 -168.593 -20.645
(0.158) (0.259) (0.140) (0.058)
Urban population 5.119 0.000 0.003 4.150 0.012 -0.001 25.819 -0.010 0.007 -1.087 0.001 0.002
(0.751) (0.993) (0.022) (0.027) (0.082) (0.755) (0.308) (0.041) (0.001) (0.638) (0.815) (0.493)
Life expectancy 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.010 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 0.015
(0.815) (0.101) (0.026) (0.076) (0.990) (0.426) (0.777) (0.057)
Logarithm of total population -0.077 -0.002 0.206 0.010 -0.082 0.019 0.037 0.024
(0.079) (0.888) (0.000) (0.446) (0.044) (0.123) (0.419) (0.050)
Investment 0.019 0.012 0.013 0.012
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.608) (0.640) (0.095) (0.811)
Inflation 0.000 -0.001 -0.013 -0.009
(0.444) (0.088) (0.000) (0.002)
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67 67 67 67 69 69 69 69 48 48 48 48 52 52 52 52
Adjusted R2 0.530 0.030 0.231 0.197 0.134 0.058 0.160 0.259 0.545 0.040 0.351 0.595 0.075 0.045 0.325 0.412
Implied threshold values 0.339 0.339 0.220 0.499 0.318 0.333 0.338 0.337 NA 0.336 0.256 0.166
Parantheses denote p-values. 
Theft Robbery Theft Robbery
Table 9
Three-stage-least squares (3SLS) estimation results for the system of 4 equations, with endogenous π
Conviction rate as proxy
Average Tax Rates Marginal Tax Rates
